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Stepwise development of a program using refinement [1, 9] ensures that the pro-
gram correctly implements its requirements. The specification of a system is
“refined” incrementally to derive an implementable program. The programming
space includes both specifications and implementable code, and is ordered with
the refinement relation which obeys some mathematical laws. Morgan proposed a
modification of this “classical” refinement for systems where the confidentiality of
some information is critical. Programs distinguish between “hidden” and “visible”
variables and refinement has to bear some security requirement. First, we review
refinement for classical programs and present Morgan’s approach for ignorance pre-
serving refinement. We introduce the Shadow Semantics, a programming model
that captures essential properties of classical refinement while preserving the ig-
norance of hidden variables. The model invalidates some classical laws which do
not preserve security while it satisfies new laws. Our approach will be algebraic,
we propose algebraic laws to describe the properties of ignorance preserving re-
finement. Thus completing the laws proposed in [7, 8, 10, 12]. Moreover, we show
that the laws are sound in the Shadow Semantics. Finally, following the approach
ii
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of Hoare and He [4] for classical programs, we give a completeness result for the
program algebra of ignorance preserving refinement.
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Stapsgewyse ontwikkeling van ’n program met behulp van verfyning verseker dat
die program voldoen aan die vereistes. Die spesifikasie van ’n stelsel word ge-
leidelik ”verfyn”wat lei tot ’n implementeerbare kode, en word georden met ‘n
verfyningsverhouding wat wiskundige wette gehoorsaam. Morgan stel ’n wysi-
ging van hierdie klassieke verfyning voor vir stelsels waar die vertroulikheid van
sekere inligting van kritieke belang is. Programme onderskei tussen ”verborgeën
”sigbare”veranderlikes en verfyning voldoen aan ’n paar sekuriteitsvereistes. Eers
hersien ons verfyning vir klassieke programme en verduidelik Morgan se benadering
tot onwetendheid behoud. Ons verduidelik die ”Shadow Semantics”, ’n program-
meringsmodel wat die noodsaaklike eienskappe van klassieke verfyning omskryf
terwyl dit die onwetendheid van verborge veranderlikes laat behoue bly. Die mo-
del voldoen nie aan n paar klassieke wette, wat nie sekuriteit laat behoue bly nie,
en dit voldoen aan nuwe wette. Ons benadering sal algebräıese wees. Ons stel
algebräıese wette voor om die eienskappe van onwetendheid behoudende verfyning
te beskryf, wat dus die wette voorgestel in [7, 8, 10, 12] voltooi. Verder wys ons
iv
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dat die wette konsekwent is in die ”Shadow Semantics”. Ten slotte, na aanleiding
van die benadering in [4] vir klassieke programme, gee ons ’n volledigheidsresultaat
vir die program algebra van onwetendheid behoudende verfyning.
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Verification of software traditionally relies on simulation, testing and code review
destined to find bugs. However these methods do not always guarantee total
correctness. For safety or security critical systems, formal verification methods
such as Model Checking and Theorem Proving provide mathematical proofs of
correctness.
Stepwise program development using refinement [1, 9] is one approach of formal
verification. Rather than proving the correctness of an existing program, refine-
ment intends to build the program correctly. As for other formal verification
methods, the first step is to write the specification in a specific mathematical lan-
guage. Specifications and the code implementing them are written in the same
language; they are all referred to as programs although perhaps abstract ones.
This formalism enables us to treat them as mathematical objects.
Reduction of nondeterminism. Informally, a specification S is refined by an im-
plementation I , denoted (S ⊑ I ) if I can replace S correctly. For terminating
programs this means that any output of I is also a possible output of S . The spec-
ification can be thought of as an equation and the implementation as a solution.
Specifications might not be feasible, as equations might not have any solution,
and they might be nondeterministic as equations might have several solutions.
The main task of refinement is to reduce the nondeterminism in the specifications
and to derive a deterministic code. We note that refinement does not capture the
efficiency of the program in terms of time and space consumption; this can be
done by choosing the most efficient between alternative refinements of the same
1
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specification. Typically matters of efficiency motivate refinement steps.
Formalisation. Having a formal programming language, the programs are given
meaning by different mathematical concepts, called semantics. Dijkstra introduced
the Guarded Command language [2] and described each program as a Predicate
Transformer : a function that maps a postcondition to its weakest precondition.
Algebraic laws based on this model have been established to allow refinement
calculii, for instance by Back [1] and Morgan [9] where the languages are extended
to include specifications. Other models include the relational model in which
programs are viewed as binary relations between states.
Program Algebra. A totally algebraic approach to programming [3] states algebraic
properties of the operators as axioms. These laws will give the meaning of the
programs. However it is necessary that the laws are consistent, i.e. they do
not contradict each other. This might be shown by proving them against one
of the programming models described earlier. The program algebra of a small
programming language will be presented in Chapter 2.
Security and refinement
Security. In addition to functional requirements (input-output for terminating
programs), some systems might be subject to security requirements such as con-
fidentiality, authentication or anonymity. We are particularly interested in non-
interference: in a multiple agents system, certain information is concealed from
certain agents. Such a requirement might be necessary for example in distributed
voting, anonymous auctions or private information retrieval.
Secure refinement. Morgan proposed stepwise refinement to derive noninterference-
aware programs [10]. In Chapter 3, we will see that this cannot be done in a
straightforward way with classical refinement techniques. Morgan’s approach was
to define a programming model following the intuition of security requirement and
the necessity of having reasonable properties. This model, called Shadow seman-
tics, is also presented in Chapter 3.
An algebra for secure refinement. In practice, stepwise derivation of a program
is done by using algebraic laws proven sound in a particular model. Stepwise
derivation of security protocols has been done, for instance, by Morgan in 2006 [10]
(Dining Cryptographers Protocol) and in 2009 [11] (Oblivious Transfer Protocol)
and by McIver in 2009 [7] (Private Information Retrieval). We are interested in
the algebraic laws that are used for deriving such protocols. In addition to those
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used by Morgan and McIver, additional laws are given in Chapter 4. They would
help us to have clearer description of the algebraic properties of noninterference-
aware programs. In the same chapter, we also give a normal form for programs
and prove that our are complete in the Shadow semantics.
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Chapter 2
Algebra of classical program
refinement
This chapter focuses on the algebraic treatment of a subset of classical programs.
The programs studied here are the classical analogue of the noninterference aware
programs used by Morgan [10] which will be studied in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.
First, programs are described and their syntax is presented, then a list of algebraic
laws characterising the program properties are given. Finally a subset of these laws
is proven to be complete. We use a normal form approach based on the work of
Hoare and He [4] which we will extend to include local blocks.
2.1 Notations
The following notations apply for this chapter
• x , y , z designate state variables,
• T designates the type of the variables,
• P ,Q ,R designate programs,
• e, f , g designate expressions,
• b designates a boolean expression,
• we use left-associating dot for application. For example f .x .y means (f .x ).y
or f (x , y) by uncurrying.
4
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2.2 Programs
The state of a program is represented by the values of the program variables
x1 : T1, . . . , xn : Tn . These variables are often abbreviated by a list of variable x
called the state space. The execution of a terminating program is characterised by
the change of its state. This is controlled by assignments to the state variables,
composition, conditional controls, repetition, . . . .
We will consider finite programs obtained by the following constructions
skip No operation
x := e Assignment
P # Q Sequential composition
P ⊳ b ⊲Q Conditional
P ⊓ Q Nondeterministic choice
|[var x : T ·P ]| Declaration of a local variable
Table 2.1: Syntax for terminating sequential programs with nondeterminism
These constitute the programming syntax for the classical programs considered
here; iteration, recursion and procedures are not presented since they are not
included in the security-aware programming language considered by Morgan in
2006 [10]. The program space yielded by the precedent constructions, together
with iteration, recursion and procedures is part of the larger space of specifications
which includes other constructs for instance guarded commands, angelic choice and
miracles. We note that the programs considered are all terminating programs: for
example, the evaluation of the expressions are assumed to terminate and give a
unique value.
2.3 Program algebra
The properties of the primitive programs and program constructors in the syntax
is described by algebraic laws. As is done in the “Laws of Programming” [3], these
laws are presented here like axioms as for any other sets of axioms in Mathematics.
The laws can be proved to be consistent and valid using program models such as
the predicate transformers model or the relational model. The proofs of these clas-
sical laws are not covered here. However, the laws for noninterference preserving
refinement in Chapter 4 will be proved using the Shadow model.
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The first law concerns skip which designates the program that does not perform
anything. It has no effect on the state variables. The sequential composition P # Q
is the program that first executes program P and then executes program Q . The
left and the right composition of a program P with skip is the program P itself,
so skip is the identity for sequential composition.
Law 2.1.
skip # P = P # skip = P
Sequential composition is associative.
Law 2.2.
(P # Q) # R = P # (Q # R)
Nondeterministic choice (P ⊓ Q) which is also known as demonic choice executes
either program P or Q ; the choice between them is determined locally. This
operator is idempotent, commutative and associative.
Law 2.3.
P ⊓ P = P
P ⊓ Q = Q ⊓ P
(P ⊓ Q) ⊓ R = P ⊓ (Q ⊓ R)
We will refer to these properties as basic properties of ⊓ ; for instance, they allow
us to write the nondeterministic choice of a (finite) set of programs P which is
denoted
d
P. In every occurrence of such program, it is assumed that the set P
is non-empty.
The two following are distribution laws of nondeterministic choice over sequential
composition. We do not have the second law for general computations but it holds
for the particular case studied here as we only consider finite nondeterminism and
terminating programs.
Law 2.4.
(P ⊓ Q) # R = (P # R) ⊓ (Q # R)
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Law 2.5.
R # (P ⊓ Q) = (R # P) ⊓ (R # Q)
Conditional (P ⊳ b ⊲Q) which is also written as P if b else Q executes program P if
predicate b holds, otherwise executes program Q . Law 2.6 is straightforward, with
Law 2.7, ensures that conditional distributes over finite nonempty nondeterminism.
Law 2.6.
P ⊳ b ⊲Q = Q ⊳ ¬b ⊲ P
Law 2.7.
P ⊳ b ⊲ (Q ⊓ R) = (P ⊳ b ⊲Q) ⊓ (P ⊳ b ⊲ R)
Assignment (x := e) where x is a list of variables and e is a list of expressions
having the length of x , is executed by evaluating all the values of the expressions
in the list e and assigning each value to the corresponding variable in x . It is
assumed that the values of the variables in the list do not change until all the
evaluations are complete.
Arbitrary assignment (or choice), denoted x :∈ E where E is a finite nonempty
set of expressions, is sometimes used in the programs. It is not to be confused
with generalised assignment (often denoted x :∈ b) where x can take any value
satisfying the boolean b. The latter is not part of the programming language in
cases when b is false or allows an infinite choice. Generalised assignment lies in
the specification space. For classical programs, choice can be written in terms of
other programs as follows
Law 2.8.
x :∈ E =
d{
e : E · x := e
}
Assigning the value of a variable to itself does not change anything, thus it is skip.
An assignment to a single variable can be rewritten as an assignment to multiple
variables by adding identity assignment. In such an assignment, the variables
assigned can be permuted as long as the corresponding expressions are subject to
the same permutation.
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Law 2.9.
(x := x ) = skip
Law 2.10.
(x := e) = (x , y := e, y)
Law 2.11.
(x , y , z := e, f , g) = (x , z , y := e, g , f )
A conditional assignment is equal to an assignment to a conditional expression.
Conditional expressions are assumed to be part of the programming language and
are defined as follows
e ⊳ b ⊲ f = e if b
= f if ¬b
Law 2.12.
(x := e ⊳ b ⊲ x := f ) = (x := e ⊳ b ⊲ f )
The sequential composition of two assignments to a variable are combined to a
single assignment by substituting the occurence of the variable in the rhs of the
second assignment by the value that has been assigned to it. This law is straight-
forward for classical programs but that is not the case, as we will see, for the
security-aware programming language.
Law 2.13.
(x := e # x := f ) = x := f .e
Two assignments to a variable are equal when the expressions assigned to them
are equal.
Law 2.14.
(x := e) = (x := f ) iff e = f
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A local block |[var x : T ·P ]| which is often written as begin var x : T ·P end
declares a local variable x for use in P . The brackets delimits the scope of the
declared variable: its value is accessible only inside its scope. Such variables are
called local variables as opposed to global ones and are used as intermediaries in
the program.
If the variable declared is not free in the program inside its scope, then the local
block containing that program is equal to the program itself
Law 2.15. If x is not free in P then
|[var x : T ·P ]| = P
When the program inside the scope of a local block assigns only to the local
variable then the local block is equal to skip. Such an assignment changes no
global variable and is equivalent to identity.
Law 2.16.
|[var x : T · x := e ]| = skip
More generally,
Law 2.17. If x is not free in f
|[var x : T · x , y := e, f ]| = (y := f )
Nondeterministic choice distributes a local block.
Law 2.18.
|[var x : T ·P ⊓ Q ]| = |[var x : T ·P ]| ⊓ |[var x : T ·Q ]|
The following law says that a local variable is initialised arbitrarily after its dec-
laration.
Law 2.19.
|[var x : V ·P ]| =
d{
e : V · |[var x : T · x := e # P ]|
}
The program space is ordered by the refinement relation denoted ⊑.
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Definition 2.1 (Classical refinement). A program P is refined by Q when Q is
at least as deterministic as P :
P ⊑ Q ≡ P ⊓ Q = P
Following the basic properties of ⊓ (Law 2.3), the relation ⊑ is reflexive, transitive
and antisymmetric. This relation is a lattice ordering on the space of specifications














⇒ P = Q
All the programming operators given here are monotonic with respect to the re-
finement order. The following laws illustrate this. They are mostly important
when developing program from specification: refinement of larger programs can
be derived from refinement of their smaller parts.
Law 2.23. If P ⊑ Q then
P # R ⊑ Q # R
Law 2.24. If P ⊑ Q then
P ⊓ R ⊑ Q ⊓ R
The set of laws that we have given in the previous section is not exhaustive; other
laws are listed elsewhere [3, 4]. We have given laws that illustrate some properties
of the programming language. A subset of these laws has been proved to be
complete [4] i.e any inequation between programs can be proved using these laws.
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2.4 Reduction to normal form
Hoare and He [4] proposed a normal form for more general programs apart from
those in the programming language. For the programming space studied here the
corresponding normal form is a finite nondeterministic choice of assignment
d
{e : E · x := e},
where x is the vector of all variables. For a singleton E = {e}, the nondeterministic
choice reduces to an assignment x := e.
To prove that any program can be reduced to this normal form, it is sufficient to
prove that the primitive programs (in the syntax) can be reduced into normal form
and that combinations of programs in normal form using the connectors (in the
syntax) yield programs also reducible to normal form. We illustrate the reduction
of programs to normal form as done by Hoare and He, adding the elimination of
local blocks.
1. skip is the identity assignment which is in normal form (Law 2.9).
2. Any assignment can be written as a total assignment (assignment to all
variables) in a uniform order by using Law 2.10 and Law 2.11, thus reducing
it to an assignment to the variable vector x which is in normal form.
3. The following equations illustrate that a conditional between two normal
forms yields a normal form.
(d




{f : F · x := f }
)
= Law 2.6 and Law 2.7
d{
e : E ; f : F · x := e ⊳ b ⊲ x := f }
= Law 2.12
d{
e : E ; f : F · x := e ⊳ b ⊲ f }
4. The following equations illustrate the elimination of sequential composition
between normal forms
(d




{f : F · x := f }
)
= Law 2.4 and Law 2.5
d
{e : E ; f : F · x := e # x := f }
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= Law 2.13
d
{e : E ; f : F · x := f .e}
5. Nondeterministic choice between normal forms yields a normal form because
of the properties of ⊓
(d








{g : E ∪ F · x := g}
6. The following illustrates the elimination of local blocks
|[var x : V ·
(d





e : V · |[var x : V · x := e #
(d






e : V · |[var x : V ·
d




e : V · |[var x : V ·
d




e : V ·
d




e : V ·
d
{f : F · |[var x : V · y := f .e ]|}
}
= Law 2.3 and Law 2.15
d{
e : V; f : F · y := f .e
}
The following laws permit the comparison of programs in normal form. The first





Q iff ∀Q : Q ·P ⊑ Q
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Law 2.26.
d
{e : E · x := e} ⊑ x := f iff f ∈ E
These two laws achieve the completeness of the laws given for the subset of pro-
grams studied here. In the following, the programs will be modified to consider
secrecy, thus the laws given in this chapter will be reconsidered but the same
approach of normal form will be used in Chapter 4.




This chapter retraces Morgan’s approach (introduced in [10]) of using refinement
techniques for reasoning about noninterference. First we discuss what were his
objectives and what assumptions he has made. Then we will look at some of the
consequences on the algebraic laws and the adjustments on the programming syn-
tax. Finally, we present Morgan’s programming model that satisfies the objectives:
the Shadow Semantics.
We will change slightly our notation from this chapter to be more convenient when
translating the programs into their semantics.
• as in [12] the program variables x, v,w, h will be written in Sans Serif,
• v ,w , h, k designate the values that those variable may assume,
• H ,K designate set of values,
• e, f designate expressions,
• E ,F designate set-valued expressions,
• V,H,K designate types of the program variables,
• P,Q designate (finite) sets of programs,
• E×F designate the Cartesian product of the sets E and F ,
• Proji .E designate the projection of E onto its i -th component, sometimes
shortened to Ei ,
14
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• for a quantifier Q we use (Qx : T | r · e.x ) to define a quantification over
the elements of T satisfying r ,
• we use {x : T | r · e.x} to define the set of elements of the form e.x for x in
T satisfying r . For example {x : N+ | x mod2 = 0 · 1x } = {12 , 14 , 18 , . . .}.
3.1 Assumptions and objectives
Morgan [10, 11] assumes that the program state is partitioned into hidden and
visible variables. The attacker is assumed not to infer the value of the hidden
variables whereas he can monitor the value of the visible ones. In addition, he
is assumed to have knowledge of the source code. Using traditional refinement
techniques for program development while preserving secrecy of the hidden variable
rise some difficulties like the “Refinement Paradox” : assuming a hidden variable
h of boolean type, the refinement h :∈ {0, 1} ⊑ h := 0 is classically valid but not
secure: an execution of the second program will leak the value of h while the first
one keeps it hidden. Morgan assumed that secure refinement does not allow such
refinement.
Morgan requires that refinement holds only if an implementation is no less secure
than its specification: an implementation can leak the value of a hidden variable
only if the specification can do so. Thus the classical definition of refinement, de-
crease of nondeterminism, is strengthened with the preserving of ignorance (of the
hidden variable). As observed in Chapter 1, the stepwise development of classical
programs using refinement relies on the monotonicity of program constructors with
respect to the refinement order; as this allows us to reason about small parts of
a program separately. Morgan listed monotonicity as one of the desirable prop-
erties that should be preserved for secure refinement. In addition: if some parts
of a program involve only visible variables, it should be possible to use classi-
cal refinement to reason about them; if the classical laws do not involve security
(when they involve only sequential composition, nondeterministic choice, identity
without explicit assignment or conditional) then they should remain valid.
These algebraic properties lead to make further assumptions. Using “gendaken”
experiments, Morgan proved that it is necessary to assume a strong attacker: not
only can he monitor the value of the visible variable but also he can observe the
program flow; for instance, he knows which branch of a nondeterministic choice or
conditional has been taken. Moreover, he has perfect recall : he can remember any
value that was taken by the visible variable, even already overwritten.
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x :∈ E Choose
|[vis v : V ·P ]| Declaration of a visible variable
|[hid h : H ·P ]| Declaration of a hidden variable
reveal e Publish an expression
〈〈P〉〉 Atomic block
Table 3.1: Syntax of the programming language, in addition to Table 2.2. In [10] and
[11] Morgan uses the brackets {{·}} to denote atomic blocks
3.2 Program syntax and examples
Some adjustments are made in the programming syntax (as seen in Table 3.2).
We will use x when the context does not distinguish between visible and hidden
variables.
Local blocks
The declaration of local variables have to distinguish between visible and hidden
variables. Thus, local blocks are of two types: the local blocks introducing a visible
variable (|[vis · ]|) and those introducing a hidden variable (|[hid · ]|). When we
do not distinguish between them, we will use |[dec · ]|.
McIver [7] allows multiple agents view of the program, thus having the declaration
of variables indexed from the point of view of each agent (making use of vis list
and hid list where list is a list of agents). However, for this study we will adopt a
single attacker point of view as is the case in [10].
Atomic choice
In the classical setting, the command choose :∈ is syntactic sugar for a nondeter-
ministic choice of assignment. The equation
x :∈ E =
d
{e : E · x := e} (3.2.1)
allows the choice operator :∈ to be discarded from the program syntax. However,
for the security and refinement programming language, the command choose is
defined to execute atomically and differs from a nondeterministic choice of assign-
ment.
Thus, two kinds of nondeterminism are considered. In a composite nondetermin-
istic choice (which we will refer to as nondeterministic choice, denoted ⊓ ,) the
attacker can observe the execution: it knows which branch of the nondeterministic
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choice has been taken. In an atomic nondeterministic choice (which we will refer
to as choice, denoted :∈), the attacker cannot see how the choice was resolved.
Thus, the program choose x :∈ E differs from the nondeterministic choice of as-
signment as the one in the rhs of (3.2.1). The nondeterministic choice operator ⊓
expresses nondeterminism between the execution of some fragments of programs
(atomic programs or larger programs).
An assignment is a particular case of choice where E is a singleton
x := e = x :∈ {e}; (3.2.2)
however, assignment and choice are both part of the programming language. For
classical programs, multiple assignment was defined and denoted by
x, y, z := e, f , g
where each variable gets the value of the expression which is in the same position
as the variable.
For the operator choose :∈, the rhs will be a set of tuples rather than a tuple of
sets. This convention is to allow a multiple choice from a set of vectors
x, y, z := {(e, f , g) : E}
as this would capture cases of the expressions assigned which are dependent on
each other, such as
x, y, z := {n : [1,N ] · (n, 2n, 3n)}
which cannot be written as x, y, z :∈ E ,F ,G
Reveal
The command reveal is one particularity of the programming language: the
program reveal e publishes an expression e, which might leak some information
about h without changing neither v nor h.
Atomic blocks
Atomicity is introduced to limit the capability of the attacker. The program 〈〈P〉〉
designates the atomic execution of program P . The attacker is assumed not to see
the execution inside atomic blocks but only between them.
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Example 3.1 (Refinement Paradox). As we have observed earlier, the traditional
aspect of refinement which is the decrease of (composite) nondeterminism does not
always apply. For a hidden boolean variable h:
h ∈ {0, 1} 6⊑ h := 0.
Example 3.2 (Perfect recall [10]). As already observed also, the attacker can keep
track of the value assigned to a visible variable even after overwriting it:
(v := h # v := 0) 6⊑ v := 0.
Example 3.3. [7] The execution of conditional choices reveals the value of the
conditional:
(skip ⊳ e.v.h ⊲ skip) 6⊑ skip.
Example 3.4. [7] For a hidden boolean variable h
h :∈ {0, 1} 6⊑ h := 0 ⊓ h := 1.
• in the composite case, afterwards the adversary knows which of atoms h := 0
or h := 1 was executed, and thus knows the value of h too; yet
• in the atomic case, afterwards he knows only that the effect was to set h to
0 or to 1, and thus knows only that h ∈ {0, 1}.
If h is replaced by a visible variable v refinement holds in 3.4. As v is visible, by
observing its final value, the attacker would know which branch of the nondeter-
ministic choice has been taken. Thus we have
Example 3.5. For a visible boolean variable v
v :∈ {0, 1} = v := 0 ⊓ v := 1.
Therefore, in this case the atomic choice is an explicit choice.
However, the following example shows that an atomic choice to a visible variable
is not always an explicit choice.
Example 3.6. For v, h visible and hidden variables of boolean type
h :∈ {0, 1} # v :∈ {h⊕ 1, h⊕ 0} 6⊑ h :∈ {0, 1} # v := (h⊕ 1) ⊓ v := (h⊕ 0)
where ⊕ designates exclusive-or.
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• in the composite case, afterwards the adversary knows which of atoms v :=
(h⊕1) or v := (h⊕0) was executed. He also knows the value assigned to the
visible variable v, then can deduce h by computing h = (v⊕ b) if the branch
v := (h⊕ b) was executed.
• in the atomic case, afterwards he knows that the effect was to set v to the
value of (h⊕0) or to (h⊕1) i.e that v is 0 or 1. He also knows value b assigned
to v, he cannot infer whether b was computed from h⊕ 1 or h⊕ 0. The two
later expressions can all give b for an appropriated value of h. This is called
the Key-Complete Condition of ⊕ [10]. Thus, the attacker knows only the
value of v (and that v ∈ {h⊕ 0, h⊕ 1} which gives no more information).
Clearly, the equation (3.2.1) does not hold in general for both hidden and visible
variables. The second example has shown that it holds for visible variables in some
cases. In fact the second example is a particular case of visible-only reasoning.
It is necessary to have a more formal way to explain these refinements. In the
following, we introduce Morgan’s Shadow model to serve that purpose.
3.3 The Shadow model
The attacker is assumed to have the capability of monitoring the execution of the
program and the value of the visible variable after each atomic step. Thus, at each
state of the program, the attacker knows the whole path that was executed with all
the successive values of the visible variable v. However, rather than characterising
the state as the history of executed commands and associated values of v, Morgan
introduced a set-valued variable H called the “Shadow”. It records the set of
possible values of the hidden variable h for all possible executions of a program
yielding the same visible variable. The state of the program is thus determined by
triples (v , h,H ) : V×H×PH corresponding to the variables (v, h,H). Each triple
satisfies h ∈ H as the actual value of h must be one of its possible values in the
Shadow.
Morgan [10] provides an operational semantics which translates v, h-programs
(noninterference aware) into classical programs with v, h,H. He also gives a pred-
icate transformer model which avoid this translation and where the logic used is
the first order logic augmented with a modality characterising the knowledge of
the attacker. However, we will adopt the program semantics which was given by
McIver in 2009 [7]: programs are modeled as V → H → P.H → (V×H×P.H).
We will refer to this model as the Shadow Semantics. Table 3.3 summarises the
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Program P Semantics JPK.v .h.H
skip {(v , h,H )}
reveal e.v.h {(v , h, {k : H | e.v .k = e.v .h})}
v := e.v.h
{
(e.v .h, h, {k : H | e.v .k = e.v .h})
}
v :∈ F .v.h
{




(v , e.v .h, {k : H · e.v .k})
}
h :∈ F .v.h
{
h ′ : F .v .h · (v , h ′, {k : H ; k ′ : F .v .k · k ′})
}
〈〈P〉〉 addShadow.(“classical semantics of P”)
P1 # P2 lift.JP2K.(JP1K.v .h.H )
P1 ⊓ P2 JP1K.v .h.H ∪ JP2K.v .h.H
Pt ⊳ b.v.h ⊲ Pf JPtK.v .h.{k : H | b.v .k} ∪ JPf K.v .h.{k : H | ¬b.v .k}
Table 3.2: Semantics of programs without loops (from [7]). The function lift.JP2K
applies JP2K to all triples in its set-valued argument, un-Currying each time, and then
takes the union of all results.
Program P Semantics JPK.v .h.H
|[visw : W ·P ]| Proj(v ,h,H ).
⋃
{
w : W · (JPK.v .w .h.H )
}
|[hid k : K ·P ]| Proj(v ,h,H ).
⋃
{




(v, h) :∈ E
{
(v ′, h ′) : E .v .h ·
(
v ′, h ′, {k : H ; k ′ : H | E .v .k ∋ (v ′, k ′) · k ′}
)
}
Table 3.3: Semantics of local blocks and simultaneous choice of a hidden and a visible
variable
semantics of the programming constructs. McIver and Morgan gave an extension
of this semantics that includes looping programs in 2011 [8].
We give an extension of the Shadow Semantics [7] to include the semantics of local
blocks and simultaneous choice (Table 3.3). The following shows how the semantics
of choose a couple (v, h) reduces to the semantics of choose a visible v when the
hidden variable h is not assigned (which is in the present context equivalent to
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assigning it to itself or skip).
J(v, h) :∈ E .v.h×{h}K.v .h.H
= semantics of simultaneous choice
{
(v ′, h ′) : (E .v .h, h) ·
(
v ′, h ′,
{





(v ′, h ′) : (E .v .h, h) ·
(
v ′, h ′,
{









k : H | v ′ ∈ E .v .k
}
)}
= semantics of :∈ for visible
Jv :∈ E .v.hK.v .h.H
Similarly, the semantics of choose a couple (v, h) reduces to the semantics of choose
a hidden h when the visible variable v is not assigned.
J(v, h) :∈ {v}×F .v.hK.v .h.H
= semantics of :∈ for (v , h)
{
(v ′, h ′) : (v ,F .v .h) ·
(
v ′, h ′,
{





h ′ : F .v .h ·
(
v , h ′,
{
k : H ; k ′ : F .v .k · k ′
}
)}
= semantics of :∈ for hidden
Jh :∈ F .v.hK.v .h.H
The semantics of atomic blocks requires the definition of addShadow: this func-
tion maps the classical semantics (JPKcl.v .k) of a program to its shadow-enhanced
semantics.
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 3. NONINTERFERENCE-PRESERVING REFINEMENT 22
Definition 3.1 (Atomic Shadow Semantics).
addShadow.P .v .h.H =
{
(v ′, h ′,H ′) : V×H×PH |
(
JPKcl.v .h ∋ (v ′, h ′)
H ′ =
{
k ′ : H | (∃ k : H · JPKcl.v .k ∋ (v ′, k ′))
}
)}
Refinement in the Shadow model
Recall that in the context of noninterference, an implementation I refines its spec-
ification S , denoted S ⊑ I ) I is more deterministic and it preserves ignorance (of
the hidden variable). The first aspect which is the classical aspect means that
from any initial state, any possible (visible) outcome of I is also a possible (visi-
ble) outcome of S . However the second aspect means that the Shadow does not
shrink with refinement. As well described by Morgan in 2012 [12], the definition
of refinement in the Shadow model should be stronger.
Indeed, the classical aspect should also be applied to the hidden variable: for
instance an assignment v := h occurring afterwards justifies this, as it would make
the hidden outcome visible. Also, the second aspect has to be strengthened: the
Shadow should not shrink with refinement for every possible outcome of v by
the implementation I . For instance the possible occurrence of a conditional like
(skip ⊳ v = e ⊲ h :∈ H) afterwards forces to consider relation between Shadows
for each value v that v can take (and hence for each value that h can take by
combining v := h and (skip ⊳ v = e ⊲ h :∈ H) afterwards). Further, one can
consider a conditional both on v and h. Therefore, the relation between Shadows
must be considered for every pair of outcomes (v ′, h ′).
Definition 3.2 (Refinement). For programs P{1,2}, P1 is securely refined by P2
and written P1 ⊑ P2 when for all v , h,H that satisfy h ∈ H
∀(v ′, h ′,H ′2) : JP2K.v .h.H · (∃H1 : PH | H ′1 ⊆ H ′2 · (v ′, h ′,H ′1) ∈ JP1K.v .h.H )
In one of his papers [12], Morgan retraces the building process of the Shadow
model and the definition of Shadow refinement (Definition 3.2). He shows that
this definition meet the following objectives:
• If S ⊑ I , for any programming context C determined by the syntax (exclud-
ing atomic block): any value of the visible variable that C(I ) can output can
also produced by C(S ), if C(I ) can leak the value of h then so can C(S )
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• If S ⊑ I , then for any context C (excluding atomic block) C(S ) ⊑ C(I )
These legitimise the choice of the definition of refinement with respect to the
desired algebraic properties namely monotonicity of contexts with respect to ⊑
and the preservation of certain class of classical laws as stated in the
Theorem 3.1 (Transfer Principle [12]). Let C1(X ,Y , . . . ,Z ) and C2(X ,Y , . . . ,Z )
be two contexts involving only visible variables,and satisfying the classical refine-
ment (⊑c)
C1(X ,Y , . . . ,Z ) ⊑c C2(X ,Y , . . . ,Z )
for all classical program fragments X ,Y , . . . ,Z — even those in which further
visible variables not appearing already in C{1,2} might occur. Then the secure re-
finement
C1(X ,Y , . . . ,Z ) ⊑ C2(X ; Y ; . . . ; Z )
holds for all program fragments X ,Y , . . . ,Z over both visible and hidden variables
Now we can come back to some of to an earlier example and use the Shadow
refinement to check it. Below the program are the associated possible states.
Example 3.4. [11]
h :∈ {0, 1} 6⊑ h := 0 ⊓ h := 1
(v , 0, {0, 1}), (v , 1, {0, 1}) (v , 0, {0}), (v , 1, {1})
The shadow in the rhs associated with (v , 0) is {0} while the only shadow associ-
ated with (v , 0) in the lhs is {0, 1} 6⊆ {0}, thus the refinement does not hold.
Example 3.5. [12]
h :∈ {0, 1} ⊓ h :∈ {2, 3} 6⊑ h :∈ {0, 1, 2}
(v , 0, {0, 1}), (v , 1, {0, 1}) (v , 0, {0, 1, 2}), (v , 1, {0, 1, 2})
(v , 2, {2, 3}), (v , 3, {0, 1}) (v , 2, {0, 1, 2})
The shadow in the rhs associated with (v , 2) is {0, 1, 2} while the only shadow
associated with (v , 2) in the lhs is {2, 3} 6⊆ {0, 1, 2}, thus the refinement does not
hold.
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The Shadow Semantics is a model that validates secure refinement while inval-
idating the insecure ones. Yet, actual program development makes use of alge-
braic reasoning: refinement steps are justified by algebraic laws. However, these
laws must be sound in the model. The following chapter concerns the algebra of
security-aware programs.




In their papers [7, 8, 10, 11], Morgan and McIver list several laws to support
reasoning about ignorance-preserving refinement. These laws were used in the de-
velopment of some security protocols such as the Dining Cryptographers, Oblivious
Transfer protocol, Millionaire’s protocol and the more recent Three Judges Proto-
col. However, the laws did not cover all the operators and need to be completed.
Our goal is first to add new laws to give more description to the programming
language. Then, to give a complete set of these laws: any ignorance-preserving
refinement between two programs can be proved using only the laws in the set. To
achieve this completeness result, we will use the technique of normal form as used
for classical programs (as detailed in Chapter 2). But, in contrast to that chapter,
the laws will be proved sound using the Shadow Model of Chapter 3.
4.1 Definitions and notations
The notations in Chapter 3 are still used here. In addition,
• for a set of vectors E , Ei designates the projection on the i -th component;
Ei ,j designates the projection on the pair of components i and j .
4.2 Algebraic laws
We are going to list laws for security-aware programs and explain them. They are
all sound in the Shadow semantics, most proofs are found in Appendix. For all
these laws, we assume two global variables v and h.
25
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Assignment and (atomic) choice
The first law describes an assignment as a particular case of choice. This law
will allow us to state the laws in terms of only choice (:∈). However, particular
instances of certain laws will be stated with assignment := when it is relevant.
The following are the equivalent of the classical laws (Law 2.10, Law 2.11) for
choice and they serve the same purpose. They allow us to write any choice into a
total choice (where all the variables appear in the lhs of the choose operator in a
standard order).
Law 4.1.
x := e = x :∈ {e}
Law 4.2.
x, y :∈ E = x, y, z :∈ {(e, f ) : E · (e, f , z )}
Law 4.3.
x, y :∈ E = y, x :∈ {(e, f ) : E · (f , e)}
As observed for classical programs, any assignment can be written as an assignment
to the vector of all the variables. However, in our framework, rather than a single
vector, we will use a pair (v, h) in which v is the vector of all visible variables and
h is the vector of all hidden ones. These first laws are straightforward and will not
be proved.
skip and reveal
Law 4.4 states that the program skip is the identity of sequential composition.
Law 4.5 which was observed by Morgan and can be used as a definition of reveal .
Law 4.4.
skip = v, h :∈ {v, h}
Law 4.5.
reveal e.v.h = |[visw : W ·w := e.v.h ]|
Proof. In Table 3.3, reveal e.v.h changes only the Shadow H maintaining the
global variables. Assigning e.v.h to a local visible variable also changes the Shadow
H in the same way and the local visible is projected away.
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Nondeterministic choice
Law 4.6 is straightforward as for classical programs.











Proof. It follows from the definition of the nondeterministic choice of a set of
programs.
Local blocks
Law 4.7 states that a local variable is assumed to be initialised arbitrarily after
its declaration, as is the case for classical programs. The proof (in Appendix) is
done for local visible variable and needs slight changes to apply for hidden ones.
Law 4.8 and its generalisation (Law 4.9) state that a local block assigning only to
a hidden local variable is skip. Law 4.10 states that superposing the declarations
of two local variables is equal to the declaration of a local variable couple. Law
4.11 states that nondeterministic choice distributes local blocks.
Law 4.7.
|[dec x : T ·P ]| = |[dec x : T · (x :∈ T # P) ]|
Proof. In Appendix 4.7.
Law 4.8.
|[hid k : H · k :∈ E ]| = skip
Proof. In Appendix 4.8.
Law 4.9. If k is not free in E1(= Proj1.E )
|[hid k : H · x, k :∈ E ]| = x :∈ E1
Law 4.10.
|[dec x : T1 · |[dec y : T2 ·P ]| ]| = |[dec (x, y) : T1×T2 ·P ]|
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Proof. Projecting away successively the two local variables is the same as project-
ing away the couple of local variables.
Law 4.11.
|[dec x : T ·P ⊓ Q ]| = |[dec x : T ·P ]| ⊓ |[dec x : T ·Q ]|
Proof. It follows from the fact that the union of the projections is equal to the
projection of the union.
We have seen that an important difference between classical and noninterference-
aware programs is that 4.8 applies only to hidden local variables. However, under
specific circumstances, a choice to a local visible variable can be eliminated. Law
4.12 is a particular case: the assignment to the local variable is irrelevant when the
two variables get assigned to the same expression. Law 4.13 is another particular
case: when the expression assigned to the local visible variable does not involve h
then the assignment can be discarded.
Law 4.12. If e = f then
|[visw : W ·w, v := e, f ]| = v := f
Law 4.13. If h is not free in e then
|[visw : W ·w, v := e, f ]| = v := f
These two laws follows from Law 4.1 defining refinement, which is also the most
general law to eliminate local visible variables. We note that the condition in the
two laws are not necessary conditions. In fact, assignment to a local visible variable
can be discarded if it reveals no more information on h than the assignment to the
global visible variable.
Conditional
As for classical sequential programs, a conditional joining two assignments to the
same variables may be replaced by a single assignment of a conditional expression
to the same variables. This can be done here, but with the precaution that the
boolean expression b defining the conditional is published, so the law for classical
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sequential programs is modified to include an assignment of the value of the con-
dition to a local variable. Law 4.15 states that nondeterministic choice distributes
conditional. Law 4.16 is straightforward: it implies that nondeterministic choice
on either side of the conditional distributes the conditional. Law 4.17 states that
conditional between local blocks can be merged into a local block containing a
conditional.
Law 4.14.
(v, h :∈ E ) ⊳ b ⊲ (v, h :∈ F ) = |[visw : W ·w, v, h :∈ {b}×(E ⊳ b ⊲ F ) ]|
Proof. In Appendix 4.14.
Law 4.15.
P ⊳ b ⊲ (Q ⊓ R) = (P ⊳ b ⊲Q) ⊓ (P ⊳ b ⊲ R)
Proof. In Appendix 4.15.
Law 4.16.
P ⊳ b ⊲Q = Q ⊳ ¬b ⊲ P
Proof. Propositional calculus.
Law 4.17. If x is not free in Q and y is not free in P then
|[dec x : T1 ·P ]| ⊳ b ⊲ |[dec y : T2 ·Q ]| = |[dec (x, y) : T1×T2 ·P ⊳ b ⊲Q ]|
Proof. In Appendix 4.17
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Sequential composition
Law 4.18 and Law 4.19 state that (explicit) nondeterministic choice distributes
sequential composition. These laws hold for the classical programs discussed in
Chapter 2 (but not for all computations in the specification space) and can be
proved in the Shadow semantics. Law 4.20 shows how a sequential composition
of local blocks can be merged into one local block. Law 4.21 is a general law for
sequential composition of choices. It states that overwriting (v, h) requires keeping
track of the first value of v using a local visible variable w. A particular case of this
law (Law 4.22) reflects the adversary’s perfect recall. It states that two successive
assignments to v can be merged as long as its first value is stored, that is achieved
using a local visible variable w. Afterwards, the knowledge of h is affected by both
the value of v and the value of w.
Law 4.18.
(P ⊓ Q) # R = (P # R) ⊓ (Q # R)
Proof. The application of lift.JRK on the union of the semantics of P and Q is the
same as the union of the application lift.JRK respectively on P and Q (because
lift.f .(A ∪B) = lift.f .A ∪ lift.f .B). Because of the context involved, this proof can
also be done using the Transfer Principle.
Law 4.19.
R # (P ⊓ Q) = (R # P) ⊓ (R # Q)
Proof. The semantics of (P ⊓ Q) applied to a triple equals the union of the
semantics of P and Q . By lifting, the semantics applies to the set of triples in R,
(because if f .a = g .a. ∪ h.a then lift.f .A = lift.g .A ∪ lift.h.A) .This proof can also
be done using the Transfer Principle
Law 4.20. If the variable x is not free in Q and the variable y is not free in P
then
|[dec x : T1 ·P ]| # |[dec y : T2 ·Q ]| = |[dec (x, y) : T1×T2 ·P # Q ]|
Proof. In Appendix 4.20.
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Law 4.21.
(v, h :∈ E .v.h # v, h :∈ F .v.h) =
|[visw : W ·w, v, h :∈ {(e1, e2) : E .v.h; (f1, f2) : F .e1.e2 · (e1, f1, f2)} ]|
Proof. In Appendix 4.21.
Law 4.22. Perfect recall
(v := e # v := f .v) = |[visw : W · (w, v := e, f .e) ]|
Example 4.1. If v is assigned to itself in the second choice, then w and v have
the same value, so Law 4.12 discards w
v, h :∈ E .v.h # h :∈ F .v.h = v, h :∈ {(e1, e2) : E .v.h; f : F .e1.e2 · (e1, f )}
If v is assigned to itself in the first choice, then the expression assigned to w (which
is v) does not involve h, so Law 4.13 discards w
h :∈ E .v.h # v, h :∈ F .v.h = v, h :∈ {e : E .v.h; (f1, f2) : F .v.e · (f1, f2)}
Example 4.2. Consider h :∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} #v := hmod 2. The assignment to v would
reveal some information on h. Indeed, using Law 4.21 and discarding the local
variable w by Law 4.12, this composition equals v, h :∈ {(0, 0), (0, 2), (1, 1), (1, 3)}.
By observing the value v the attacker knows the parity of h.
Atomic blocks
As observed in Chapter 2, atomic blocks were introduced in [10] to allow some
computation to be hidden from the attacker. Programs inside atomic brackets
are treated as classical programs i.e. there is no distinction between visible and
hidden variables. This is possible because apart from this distinction, the remain-
ing uncommon command reveal can be expressed using the other operators (Law
4.5).
Law 4.23. If P = Q in the classical context then 〈〈P〉〉 = 〈〈Q〉〉
Proof. It follows directly from the semantics of 〈〈·〉〉.
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It is important to note that the equalities in 4.23 cannot be weakened to refinement
as illustrated by the following counter-example.
Example 4.3. [10] In the classical setting (h := 0 ⊓ h := 1) ⊑ h := 0. However
for noninterference-aware programs 〈〈(h := 0) ⊓ (h := 1)〉〉 6⊑ 〈〈h := 0〉〉.
Atomic block is the only non-monotonic combinator with respect to the refinement
ordering. Law 4.24 states that a nondeterministic choice of assignments executed




(e, f ) : E · (v, h) := (e, f )
}
〉〉 = (v, h) :∈ E
Proof. In Appendix 4.24.
.
4.3 Reduction to normal form
The primitive commands: assignment, (atomic) choice,
skip and reveal
Recall that the normal form for classical programs is
d{
e : E · x := e
}
.
We not that choice :∈ is not captured by this normal form. However, we have seen
that by Law 4.2 and Law 4.3, we can write any choice as a total choice. Thus, at
first, we propose
d{
E : E · x :∈ E
}
to be the normal form. However, this does not also capture all our programs.
For instance, the basic command reveal cannot be written in this form. We
will also see that unlike classical programs, the sequential composition, the condi-
tional cannot be eliminated between this normal form. Moreover, although :∈ is a
nondeterministic choice, it differs from the explicit nondeterministic choice ⊓ (as
explained in Chapter 3). Thus, as for classical programs, our final normal form
should include explicit nondeterministic choice. Yet, a nondeterministic choice of
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atomic choice still cannot express the basic command reveal . These observa-
tions conduct us to take a normal form that includes a local visible variable as the
following:
d
{E : E · |[visw : W · (w, v, h :∈ E .v.h) ]|}.
This is our normal form; it is important to notice that the expression in the rhs of
the choose operator does not depend on the local variable w. The previous normal
form for choice and assignment can be written in this form by adding an identity
assignment to w.
We have seen that skip, reveal , choice and assignment can be written in our
normal form. Now, we will see how we can eliminate the other commands operating
on programs in normal form.
Elimination of nondeterministic choice
Nondeterministic choice between programs in normal form can be reduced to nor-
mal form by Law 4.6.
Elimination of conditional
A conditional joining two programs in normal forms can be reduced to normal
form as follows. We start with a program of the form
d
{E : E · |[visw : W · (w, v, h :∈ E .v.h) ]|}
⊳ b ⊲
d
{F : F · |[vis u : U · (w, v, h :∈ F .v.h) ]|}.
Then:
• by Law 4.15 the nondeterministic choices distribute the conditional;
• by Law 4.17 each pair of local blocks joined by the conditional can be merged;
• by Law 4.14 the conditional joining choices can be reduced to a choice to
conditional, yielding an assignment of the value of b to a local visible variable;
• by Law 4.10 the scopes of the local variables can be merged yielding a pro-
gram in normal form.
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Elimination of sequential composition
A sequential composition of programs in normal form can be reduced to normal
form as follows. We start from a program of the form
d
{E : E · |[visw : W · (w, v, h :∈ E .v.h) ]|}
#
d
{F : F · |[vis u : U · (w, v, h :∈ F .v.h) ]|}.
Then:
• by Law 4.18 and Law 4.19 the nondeterministic choices distributes the se-
quential composition;
• by Law 4.20, each pair of local blocks joined by a # can be merged into a
single local block,
• by Law 4.21, each sequential composition of choices can be reduced to a
single choice.
Elimination of hid local blocks
A program |[hid k : K ·P ]| with P is in normal form can be reduced to normal
form. The two local blocks can be merged by Law 4.10. Because of the law of
initialisation of local blocks, the rhs of the choice in P can be rewritten not to be
a function of the local hidden variable using laws of composition. Then, the choice
to the local hidden variable k can be discarded by Law 4.9.
|[hid k : K ·P ]|
= Definition of normal form
|[hid k : K ·
d{




|[hid k : K · |[visw : W ·
d{
E : E ·w, v, h :∈ E .v.h.k
}
]| ]|
= Law 4.10 twice
|[visw : W · |[hid k : K ·
d{




|[visw : W · |[hid k : K ·
(
k :∈ K #
d{





distributes # Law 4.19
|[visw : W · |[hid k : K ·
(d{
E : E · k :∈ K # w, v, h :∈ E .v.h.k
})
]| ]|
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= Law 4.21
|[visw : W · |[hid k : K ·
(d{
E : E ·
{




= Law 4.9 as k is not free in F .v.h.κ = {e : E .v.h.κ; l : K ∩ (E .v.h)−1.e · (e, l)}
|[visw : W ·
d{
E : E ·w, v, h :∈ {κ : K ·F .v.h.κ}
}
]|
= Law 4.11, G .v.h = {κ : K ·F .v.h.κ}
d{
E : E · |[visw : W ·w, v, h :∈ G .v.h ]|
}
Elimination of vis local blocks
A program |[vis u : U ·P ]| where P in normal form can be reduced to normal form.
The two blocks can be merged by Law 4.10. As for hid local blocks, because of
the initialisation law, the rhs of the choice in P can be written to be independent
from w. However the assignment to w is be discarded yet the result is in normal
form.
|[vis u : U ·P ]|
= Definition of normal form
|[vis u : U ·
d{




|[vis u : U · |[visw : W ·
d{
E : E ·w, v, h :∈ E .u.v.h
}
]| ]|
= Law 4.10 twice
|[visw : W · |[vis u : U ·
d{




|[visw : W · |[vis u : U ·
(
u :∈ U # d
{




|[visw : W · |[vis u : U ·
(d{




|[visw : W · |[vis u : U ·
(d{




|[vis u,w : U×W ·
(d{
E : E · u,w, v, h :∈ {ν : U ·E .ν.v.h}
})
]|
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Elimination of atomic blocks
The particularity of atomic blocks is that classical algebraic laws apply inside them.
When interpreted classically, the noninterference-aware programming language is
the same as its classical analogue. Thus the laws used inside a local block are those
listed in Chapter 2. From the completeness result of that chapter, any program
inside the local block can be written in classical normal form as follows:
〈〈
d
{E : E · |[visw : W · (w, v, h :∈ E .v.h) ]|}〉〉
= Law 2.17 (classical), because w is not free in E .v.h
〈〈
d
{E : E · (v, h :∈ E1,2.v.h)}〉〉




















Finally we get a program in the normal form, which is actually an atomic program.
Refinement
Refinement is now defined as decrease of composite nondeterminism and preser-
vation of ignorance. Recall that composite nondeterminism is a demonic choice in
which the attacker knows the computation whereas an atomic choice is a demonic
choice in which he can not know how the choice was made. Composite nonde-
teministic choices make use of ⊓ operating between program fragments whereas
the atomic nondeterministic choice is expressed by :∈. Some instances of atomic
choice can be considered as composite ones. In v, h :∈ {(0, 0), (1, 1)}, the attacker
always knows how the choice was made by observing the final value of the visible
variable.
The first aspect of refinement, which is the decrease of nondeterminism, is char-
acterised as for classical programs in Chapter 2 by
Law 4.25.
P ⊑ Q ≡ P ⊓ Q = P
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A nondeterministic (explicit) choice of programs refines its specification if and
only if each program in the branches refines the specification. This is a direct




P iff ∀P : P ·Q ⊑ P
The previous law allows treatment individually of the branches of a nondetermin-
istic choice in the rhs of the refinement. Each refinement can then be decided by
the following law, which we state as a theorem.
Theorem 4.1.
d{
E : E · |[visw ·w, v, h :∈ E .v.h ]|
}
⊑ |[visw ·w, v, h :∈ F .v.h ]|
iff
∀ v , h :∈ V×H; ∀(w ′, v ′, h ′) : F .v .h ·
∃E ∈ E ∧ ∃(w∼, v ′, h ′) ∈ E .v .h |
∀ k : H ·E0,1.v .k ∋ (w∼, v ′) ⇒
(
F0,1.v .k ∋ (w
′
, v ′) ⇒ E2.v .k ⊆ (F2.v .h ∪ F2.v .k)
F0,1.v .k 6∋ (w
′
, v ′) ⇒ E2.v .k ⊆ F2.v .h
)
Proof. In Appendix 4.1.
In the following, we list more practical corollaries of this theorem.
Corollary 4.1. For sets of expressions E ∈ E that do not contain h
d{
E : E · (v, h) :∈ E
}







Corollary 4.2. For sets of expressions E ∈ E that do not contain h
d{
E : E · h :∈ E
}
⊑ h :∈ F iff ∃ Es : P.E ·F =
⋃
Es
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Corollary 4.3. For sets of expressions E ∈ E that do not contain h
d{
E : E · v :∈ E
}




reveal e ⊑ reveal f iff ∀ v : V · πe.v ⊆ πf .v
where πe.v designates the canonical surjection:
H −→ PH; h 7−→ (e.v)−1.(e.v).h
4.4 Soundness and completeness
We have seen that the given subset of the laws, are sound in the shadow model.
Those laws permit us to reduce any security-aware program into the proposed
normal form. We have also given a theorem to prove refinement between programs
in normal form. Therefore any refinement that holds in the Shadow model can be
proved using algebraic laws (particularly the classical laws 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7,
2.9, 2.10, 2.11, 2.12, 2.13, 2.15, 2.17, 2.18, 2.19, 2.25, 2.26, the security-aware laws
4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, 4.10, 4.11, 4.14, 4.15, 4.16, 4.17, 4.18, 4.19, 4.20,
4.21, 4.24, 4.26 and Theorem 4.1), this is our completeness result. It implies that
program development can be done by using only algebraic laws without need of
the semantics. In summary:
Theorem 4.2 (Completeness). For noninterference-aware programs P and Q
If P ⊑ Q in the Shadow semantics then P ⊑ Q can be proved algebraically
This completeness result implies for instance that any other law can be proved
using the complete set of laws. For example:
Law 4.27.
〈〈〈〈P〉〉〉〉 = 〈〈P〉〉
Proof. Using the normal form of P
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〈〈
d
{E : E · |[visw : W · (w, v, h :∈ E .v.h) ]|}〉〉
















= elimination of atomic blocks
〈〈〈〈
d
{E : E · |[visw : W · (w, v, h :∈ E .v.h) ]|}〉〉〉〉.
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Conclusion
We have presented a complete set of laws for classical sequential nondeterministic
programs: in the classical context refinement between programs can be proved
entirely algebraically (Chapter 2). This has motivated us to establish algebraic
laws for stepwise refinement of security protocols. Our work has been based on
Morgan’s approach to secure refinement which distinguishes between visible and
hidden program variables. The first issue about secure refinement is to avoid the
Refinement Paradox h := {0, 1} ⊑ h := 0 which has been overcome by assuming
two kinds of nondeterminism: atomic h :∈ {0, 1} and composite (h := 0 ⊓ h := 1).
Algebraic requirements (monotonicity, classical treatment of visible-only program
fragments) lead Morgan to make further assumptions: the attacker can see pro-
gram flow (perfect recall, resolution of explicit nondeterminism, resolution of con-
ditional). While these led him to construct the Shadow semantics, a model for
noninterference-aware programs, they have inspired us to establish the algebraic
laws. We have given sufficient laws to obtain normal form. As noninterference
aware programs behave differently from classical ones, the normal form
d
{E : E · |[visw : W · (w, v, h :∈ E .v.h) ]|}
differs from the classical one. Although the list of laws is not exhaustive, aiming to
get the normal form has led us to explore properties of all program constructors.
We have proved that the laws were sound in the Shadow semantics. Finally we
have proved the completeness of the laws with respect to the shadow semantics.
A model has been built by Morgan for correctness and security of programs .
We have contributed to the corresponding refinement algebra by establishing laws
in a more systematic way: the completeness of the laws ensures that derivation
of protocols can be done entirely algebraically. In addition, the laws and the
40
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normal form given here can prove further sound laws without translating them
into semantics. Time has not allowed us to give the case study (an anonymous
auction protocol) that illustrates the use of these laws. This would be part of the
future work, together with the treatment of iteration and recursion. Other projects
are to extend the program to include other specification constructs and to establish
algebraic laws for refinement of programs that feature both noninterference and
probability [5, 6].
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Soundness proofs
Law 4.7.
|[dec x : V ·P ]| = |[dec x : V · (x :∈ V # P) ]|
Proof. We will prove for the case of only vis , the case of hid is similar.
J|[visw : V · (w :∈ V # P) ]|K.v .h.H




w : V · J(w :∈ V # P)K.w .v .h.H
}




w : V · lift.JPK.Jw :∈ VK.w .v .h.H
}




w : V · lift.JPK.{w ′ : V · (w ′, v , h,H )}
}




w : V ·
⋃
{w ′ : V · .JPK.w ′.v .h.H }
}
= w is not free in JPK.w ′.v .h.H
Projv ,h,H .
⋃
{w ′ : V · .JPK.w ′.v .h.H }
= semantics of local blocks
J|[visw : V ·P ]|K
Law 4.8.
|[hid k : H · k :∈ E ]| = skip
43
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Proof.
Jbegin hid k : H · k :∈ E endK.v .h.H




k : H · Jk :∈ EK.v .(h, k).(H×H)
}




k : H · {k ′ : E .v .(h, k) · (v , (h, k ′),H×{l : H; l ′ : E .v .(h, l) · l ′}}
}
= set union distributes Proj, calculus
{(v , h,H )}
= identity is skip
JskipK.v .h.H
Law 4.14.
(v, h :∈ E ) ⊳ b ⊲ (v, h :∈ F ) = |[visw : W ·w, v, h :∈ {b}×(E ⊳ b ⊲ F ) ]|
Proof.
Je :∈ E ⊳ b ⊲ v, h :∈ F K.v .h.H
= semantics of conditional
Jv, h :∈ EK.v .h.Hb ∪ Jv, h :∈ F K.v .h.H¬b
= semantics of :∈ twice
{




(v ′, h ′) : F .v .h · (v ′, h ′, {k : H¬b # k ′ : H | F .v .k ∋ (v ′, k ′)}
}




w : W ·
{




(v ′, h ′) : F .v .h · (¬b.v .h, v ′, h ′, {k : H | ¬b.v .k # k ′ : H | F .v .k ∋ (v ′, k ′)}
}
}




w : W · Jw , v , h :∈ {b}×E ⊳ b ⊲ F K
}
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= semantics of local blocks
J|[visw : W ·w, v, h :∈ {b}×(E ⊳ b ⊲ F ) ]|K.v .h.H
Law 4.15.
P ⊳ b ⊲ (Q ⊓ R) = (P ⊳ b ⊲Q) ⊓ (P ⊳ b ⊲ R)
Proof.
JP ⊳ b ⊲ (Q ⊓ R)K.v .h.H
= semantics of conditional, Hb = {k : H | b.v .k}
JPK.v .h.Hb ∪ JQ ⊓ RK.v .h.H¬b
= semantics of ⊓
JPK.v .h.Hb ∪ JQK.v .h.H¬b ∪ JRK.v .h.H¬b
= set calculus
JPK.v .h.Hb ∪ JQK.v .h.H¬b ∪ JPK.v .h.Hb ∪ JRK.v .h.H¬b
= semantics of conditional
JP ⊳ b ⊲QK.v .h.H ∪ JP ⊳ b ⊲ RK.v .h.H
= semantics of ⊓
J(P ⊳ b ⊲Q) ⊓ (P ⊳ b ⊲R)K.v .h.H
Law 4.17. If x is not free in Q and y is not free in P then
|[dec x : T1 ·P ]| ⊳ b ⊲ |[dec y : T2 ·Q ]|=|[dec (x, y) : T1×T2 ·P ⊳ b ⊲Q ]|
Proof.
q
|[dec x : T1 ·P ]| ⊳ b ⊲ |[dec y : T2 ·Q ]|
y
.v .h.H
= semantics of conditional
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J|[ x : T1 ·P ]|K.v .h.Hb ∪ J|[dec y : T2 ·Q ]|K.v .h.H¬b




x : T1 · JPK.x .v .h.Hb
}
∪ Projv ,h,H .
⋃
{
y : T2 · JQK.x .v .h.H¬b
}




x : T1; (x
′
, v ′, h ′,H ′) : JPK.x .v .h.Hb · (x ′, y , v ′, h ′,H ′)
}
∪ Projv ,h,H .
⋃
{
y : T2; (y
′
, v ′, h ′,H ′) : JQK.y .v .h.H¬b · (x , y ′, v ′, h ′,H ′)
}




x , y : T1×T2 · JPK.x .y .v .h.Hb ∪ JQK.x .y .v .h.H¬b
}
= semantics of local blocks
J|[dec x, y : T1×T2 ·P ⊳ b ⊲Q ]|K.v .h.H
Law 4.20. If the variable x is not free in Q and the variable y is not free in P
then
|[dec x : T1 ·P ]| # |[dec y : T2 ·Q ]|=|[dec (x, y) : T1×T2 ·P # Q ]|
Proof.
q
|[dec x : T1 ·P ]| # |[dec y : T2 · ]|
y
.v .h.H
= semantics of #
lift.J|[dec x : T2 ·Q ]|K.J|[dec x : T1 ·P ]|K.v .h.H
= semantics of local blocks
lift.J|[dec x : T2 ·Q ]|K.Projv ,h,H .
⋃
{
x : T1 · JPK.x .v .h.H
}
= definition of lift
⋃
{
x : T1 ·
⋃
{
lift.J|[dec y : T2 ·Q ]|K.Projv ,h,H JPK.x .v .h.H
}
= definition of lift
⋃
{
x : T1 ·
⋃
{
(v ′, h ′,H ′) : Projv ,h,H JPK.x .v .h.H · Jdec y : T2 ·QK.v ′.h ′.H ′
}
}
= semantics of local blocks
⋃
{
x : T1 ·
⋃
{
(v ′, h ′,H ′) : Projv ,h,H JPK.x .v .h.H ·Projv ,h,H .
⋃
{y : T2 · JQK.y .v ′.h ′.H ′}
}
}
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x : T1 ·
⋃
{y : T2 ·
⋃
{






x : T1 ·
⋃
{y : T2 ·Projv ,h,H .
⋃
{
(v ′, h ′,H ′) : Projv ,h,H .JPK.x .v .h.H · JQK.y .v ′.h ′.H ′}
}
}
= y is not free in P and x is not free in Q
⋃
{
x : T1 ·
⋃
{y : T2 ·Projv ,h,H .
⋃
{






(x , y) : T1×T2 ·Projv ,h,H .lift.JQK.JPK.x .y .v .h.H
}
= semantics of #
⋃
{
(x , y) : T1×T2 ·Projv ,h,H .JP # QK.x .y .v .h.H
}
= semantics of local blocks
J|[dec (x, y) : T1×T2 ·P # Q ]|K.v .h.H
Law 4.21.
(v, h :∈ E .v.h # v, h :∈ F .v.h) =
|[visw : W ·w, v, h :∈ {(e1, e2) : E .v.h; (f1, f2) : F .e1.e2 · (e1, f1, f2)} ]|
Proof.
Jv, h :∈ E .v.h # v, h :∈ F .v.hK.v .h.H
= semantics of #
lift.Jv, h :∈ F .v.hK.Jv, h :∈ E .v.hK.v .h.H
= semantics of :∈
lift.Jv , h :∈ F .v .hK.
{
(v ′, h ′) : E .v .h · (v ′, h ′, {k : H ; k ′ : H | E .v .k ∋ (v ′, k ′) · k ′}
}
= definition of lift
⋃
{
(v ′, h ′) : E .v .h · J(v , h) :∈ F .v .hK.v ′.h ′.{k : H ; k ′ : H | E .v .k ∋ (v ′, k ′) · k ′}
}
= semantics of :∈
⋃
{
(v ′, h ′) : E .v .h ·
{
(v ′′, h ′′) : F .v ′.h ′ ·
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(v ′′, h ′′, {k : H ; k ′ : H | E .v .k ∋ (v ′, k ′); k ′′ : H | F .v ′.k ′ ∋ (v ′′, k ′′) · k ′′}
}
}
= rewrite without ∪
{
(v ′, h ′) : E .v .h; (v ′′, h ′′) : F .v ′.h ′ ·
(v ′′, h ′′, {k : H ; k ′ : H | E .v .k ∋ (v ′, k ′); k ′′ : H | F .v ′.k ′ ∋ (v ′′, k ′′) · k ′′}
}
= rename (v ′, h ′, k ′, v ′′, h ′′, k ′′) to (w ′, e2, e∼2 , v
′
, h ′, k ′)
{
(w ′, e2) : E .v .h; (v
′
, h ′) : F .w ′.e2 ·
(v ′, h ′, {k : H ; (w ′, e∼2 ) : E .v .k ; k
′ : H | F .w ′.e∼2 ∋ (v
′
, k ′) · k ′})
}




w : W ·
{
(w ′, e2) : E .v .h; (v
′
, h ′) : F .w ′.e2 ·
(w ′, v ′, h ′, {k : H ; (w ′, e∼2 ) : E .v .k ; k
′ : H | F .w ′.e∼2 ∋ (v
′
, k ′) · k ′})
}
}




w : W ·
q













(e, f ) : E .v.h · (v, h) := (e, f )
}










= semantics of 〈〈·〉〉
addShadow.
d{
(e, f ) : E .v.h · (v, h) := (e, f )
}
.v .h.H
= definition of addShadow
{
(v ′, h ′,H ′) |
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(




k : H ·
{




= classical semantics of :∈
{
(v ′, h ′,H ′) |
(




k : H ·
{




= redundant (v ′, h ′,H ′)
{
(v ′, h ′) : E .v .h ·
(
v ′, h ′,
⋃
{





(v ′, h ′) : E .v .h ·
(
v ′, h ′,
{
k : H ; k ′ : H | E .v .k ∋ (v ′, k ′) · k ′
}
)}
= semantics of simultaneous :∈
q





E : E · |[visw ·w, v, h :∈ E .v.h ]|
}
⊑ |[visw ·w, v, h :∈ F .v.h ]|
iff
∀ v , h :∈ V×H; ∀(w ′, v ′, h ′) : F .v .h ·
∃E ∈ E ∧ ∃(w∼, v ′, h ′) ∈ E .v .h |
∀ k : H ·E0,1.v .k ∋ (w∼, v ′) ⇒
(
F0,1.v .k ∋ (w
′
, v ′) ⇒ E2.v .k ⊆ (F2.v .h ∪ F2.v .k)
F0,1.v .k 6∋ (w
′
, v ′) ⇒ E2.v .k ⊆ F2.v .h
)
Proof. To prove this law in the model, we need to show the shadow refinement
(Definition 3.2). Translating both programs into their semantics yields for the lhs
J
d{






E : E ·
{
w ′, v ′, h ′ : E .v .h ·
(
v ′, h ′, {k : H ; k ′ : H | E .v .k ∋ (w ′, v ′, k ′) · k ′}
}
}
= rename w ′ to w∼
⋃
{
E : E ·
{
w∼, v ′, h ′ : E .v .h ·
(
v ′, h ′, {k : H ; k ′ : H | E .v .k ∋ (w∼, v ′, k ′) · k ′}
)}
}
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and for the rhs
J|[visw ·w, v, h :∈ F .v.h ]|K.v .h.H
= semantics
{
w ′, v ′, h ′ : F .v .h ·
(
v ′, h ′, {k : H ; k ′ : H | F .v .k ∋ (w ′, v ′, k ′) · k ′}
)}
By the definition of refinement in the shadow semantics: for any initial triples
(v , h,H ) each final triples in the rhs must correspond to a final triple in the lhs
whose values of the variables are the same but with no larger shadow. Using the
semantics of the programs given above we have:
d{
E : E · |[visw ·w, v, h :∈ E .v.h ]|
}
⊑ |[visw ·w, v, h :∈ F .v.h ]|
≡ definition of refinement in the semantics
∀(v , h,H ) | H ∋ h ·
∀(v ′, h ′, {k : H ; k ′ : H | F .v .k ∋ (w ′, v ′, k ′) · k ′}) | w ′, v ′, h ′ ∈ F .v .h ·
∃E ∈ E ∧ ∃(v ′, h ′, {k : H ; k ′ : H | E .v .k ∋ (w∼, v ′, k ′) · k ′}) | w∼, v ′, h ′ ∈ E .v .h ·
{k : H ; k ′ : H | E .v .k ∋ (w∼, v ′, k ′) · k ′} ⊆ {k : H ; k ′ : H | F .v .k ∋ (w ′, v ′, k ′) · k ′}
≡ v ′, k ′,w ′,w∼ are the only free variable inside the shadows
∀(v , h,H ) | H ∋ h ·
∀w ′, v ′, h ′ : F .v .h ·
∃E ∈ E ∧ ∃w∼, v ′, h ′ ∈ E .v .h |
{k : H ; k ′ : H | E .v .k ∋ (w∼, v ′, k ′) · k ′} ⊆ {k : H ; k ′ : H | F .v .k ∋ (w ′, v ′, k ′) · k ′}
≡ E2.v .k = Proj2.E .v .k = {k
′ : H | (w∼, v ′, k ′) ∈ E .v .k}, same for F2.v .k
∀(v , h,H ) | H ∋ h ·
∀w ′, v ′, h ′ : F .v .h ·
∃E ∈ E ∧ ∃w∼, v ′, h ′ ∈ E .v .h |
⋃
{k : H | E0,1.v .k ∋ (w
∼
, v ′) ·E2.v .k} ⊆
⋃
{k : H | F0,1.v .k ∋ (w
′
, v ′) ·F2.v .k}
≡ definition of lift
∀(v , h,H ) | H ∋ h ·
∀w ′, v ′, h ′ : F .v .h ·
∃E ∈ E ∧ ∃w∼, v ′, h ′ ∈ E .v .h |
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lift.E2.v .{k : H | E0,1.v .k ∋ (w
∼
, v ′)} ⊆ lift.F2.v .{k : H | F0,1.v .k ∋ (w
′
, v ′)}
It is necessary and sufficient to prove that the inequality holds for singleton H s.
In fact we can prove particular cases of H to be a sufficient condition. It is sufficient
consider only the sets of pair {h, k} for k ∈ H.
Indeed, assume that
∀ k : H ·F .({h, k} ∩ A) ⊆ G .({h, k} ∩ B).
A shadow H is of the form {h, k1, . . . , kn}, then
F .({h} ∩ A) ⊆ G .({h, k} ∩ B)
F .({h, k1} ∩ A) ⊆ G .({h, k1} ∩ B)
...
F .({h, kn} ∩ A) ⊆ G .({h, kn} ∩ B)
⇒ f (A) ∪ f (B) = f (A ∪ B)
F .({h, k1, . . . , kn} ∩ A) ⊆ G .({h, k1, . . . , kn} ∩ B).
Therefore we can write
d{
E : E · |[visw ·w, v, h :∈ E .v.h ]|
}
⊑ |[visw ·w, v, h :∈ F .v.h ]|
≡
∀ v , h :∈ V×H; ∀ k : H
∀w ′, v ′, h ′ : F .v .h ·
∃E ∈ E ∧ ∃w∼, v ′, h ′ ∈ E .v .h |
lift.E2.v .
(











≡ {h, k} ⊆ H
∀ v , h :∈ V×H; ∀ k : H
∀w ′, v ′, h ′ : F .v .h ·
∃E ∈ E ∧ ∃w∼, v ′, h ′ ∈ E .v .h |
lift.E2.v .
(
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≡ (∀ k : H · p.k) ⇒ p.h
∀ v , h :∈ V×H; ∀ k : H
∀w ′, v ′, h ′ : F .v .h ·
∃E ∈ E ∧ ∃w∼, v ′, h ′ ∈ E .v .h |
E2.v .h ⊆ F2.v .h ∧
lift.E2.v .
(










≡ q ≡ (p ⇒ q) ∧ (¬p ⇒ q)
∀ v , h :∈ V×H; ∀ k : H
∀w ′, v ′, h ′ : F .v .h ·
∃E ∈ E ∧ ∃w∼, v ′, h ′ ∈ E .v .h |
E2.v .h ⊆ F2.v .h ∧
E0,1.v .k ∋ (w
∼
, v ′) ⇒
lift.E2.v .
(











E0,1.v .k 6∋ (w
∼
, v ′) ⇒
lift.E2.v .
(










≡ (p ⇒ q) ⇒ (p ⇒ (p ∧ q))
∀ v , h :∈ V×H; ∀ k : H
∀w ′, v ′, h ′ : F .v .h ·
∃E ∈ E ∧ ∃w∼, v ′, h ′ ∈ E .v .h |
E2.v .h ⊆ F2.v .h ∧
E0,1.v .k ∋ (w
∼
, v ′) ⇒ lift.E2.v .{h, k} ⊆ lift.F2.v .
(





E0,1.v .k 6∋ (w
∼
, v ′) ⇒ lift.E2.v .{h} ⊆ lift.F2.v .
(




≡ E2.v .h ⊆ F2.v .h ⊆ lift.F2.v .
(




∀ v , h :∈ V×H; ∀ k : H
∀w ′, v ′, h ′ : F .v .h ·
∃E ∈ E ∧ ∃w∼, v ′, h ′ ∈ E .v .h |
E2.v .h ⊆ F2.v .h ∧
E0,1.v .k ∋ (w
∼
, v ′) ⇒ lift.E2.v .{h, k} ⊆ lift.F2.v .
(





E0,1.v .k 6∋ (w
∼
, v ′) ⇒ true
≡ q ≡ (p ⇒ q) ∧ (¬p ⇒ q)
∀ v , h :∈ V×H; ∀ k : H
∀w ′, v ′, h ′ : F .v .h ·
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∃E ∈ E ∧ ∃w∼, v ′, h ′ ∈ E .v .h |
E2.v .h ⊆ F2.v .h ∧
E0,1.v .k ∋ (w
∼
, v ′) ⇒
(
F0,1.v .k ∋ (w
′
, v ′) ⇒ lift.E2.v .{h, k} ⊆ lift.F2.v .
(





F0,1.v .k 6∋ (w
′
, v ′) ⇒ lift.E2.v .{h, k} ⊆ lift.F2.v .
(





≡ (p ⇒ q) ⇒ (p ⇒ (p ∧ q))
∀ v , h :∈ V×H; ∀ k : H
∀w ′, v ′, h ′ : F .v .h ·
∃E ∈ E ∧ ∃w∼, v ′, h ′ ∈ E .v .h |
E2.v .h ⊆ F2.v .h ∧
E0,1.v .k ∋ (w
∼
, v ′) ⇒
(
F0,1.v .k ∋ (w
′
, v ′) ⇒ lift.E2.v .{h, k} ⊆ lift.F2.v{h, k}∧
F0,1.v .k 6∋ (w
′
, v ′) ⇒ lift.E2.v .{h, k} ⊆ lift.F2.v .{h}
)
≡ definition of lift
∀ v , h :∈ V×H; ∀ k : H
∀w ′, v ′, h ′ : F .v .h ·
∃E ∈ E ∧ ∃w∼, v ′, h ′ ∈ E .v .h |
E2.v .h ⊆ F2.v .h ∧
E0,1.v .k ∋ (w
∼
, v ′) ⇒
(
F0,1.v .k ∋ (w
′
, v ′) ⇒ (E2.v .h ∪ E2.v .k) ⊆ (F2.v .h ∪ F2.v .k)∧
F0,1.v .k 6∋ (w
′
, v ′) ⇒ (E2.v .h ∪ E2.v .k) ⊆ F2.v .h
)
let A = E2.v .h, B = F2.v .h, C = E2.v .k and D = F2.v .k
≡ then (A ⊆ B) ∧ (A ∪ C ⊆ B ∪D) ⇒ C ∪ (B ∪ D)
and (A ⊆ B) ∧ (A ∪C ⊆ B) ⇒ C ∪ B
∀ v , h :∈ V×H; ∀ k : H
∀w ′, v ′, h ′ : F .v .h ·
∃E ∈ E ∧ ∃w∼, v ′, h ′ ∈ E .v .h |
E2.v .h ⊆ F2.v .h ∧
E0,1.v .k ∋ (w
∼
, v ′) ⇒
(
F0,1.v .k ∋ (w
′
, v ′) ⇒ E2.v .k ⊆ (F2.v .h ∪ F2.v .k)∧
F0,1.v .k 6∋ (w
′
, v ′) ⇒ E2.v .k ⊆ F2.v .h
)
.
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This corresponds to the condition in our theorem as the condition E2.v .h ⊆ F2.v .h
is included in the main condition.
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